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Abstract
We study the provision of a public project that globally behaves as a public good but locally
behaves as a private bad. This scenario imposes two problems: (i) finding a compensation
that makes the project acceptable for the pre-determined host, and (ii) securing the budget to
pay for the project and the required compensation. We use a market-like mechanism with two
useful properties for this scenario: players can either contribute or request subsidies to fund
the public project, and players have veto power over the desired project quantity. In our game,
two players benefit from a waste incinerator facility, whereas the third group member, the host,
is harmed if the facility is too large. We analyze the efficiency and the redistributive potential of
this mechanism, with and without communication, among group members. We find that the
probability of positive provision did not differ with and without communication. However,
average provided quantities with respect to the efficient quantity increased from 54% to 81%
with communication. We also find that contributions fell below the Lindahl taxes, allowing the
players who benefit from a larger facility to accrue most of the efficiency gains. The latter result
is consistent with the infrequent evidence of veto threats as a bargaining strategy.
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1 Introduction
Public projects that are asymmetrically valued among their global and local users might lead to
“NIMBY” (Not In My Back-Yard) problems (Schively, 2007). Waste management facilities, nu-
clear reactors, and prisons are examples of these projects, defined as noxious goods, because they
provide a public benefit at the global level, but create a private cost to the project host.
The provision of a noxious project poses two problems. First, a compensation problem: finding
a transfer that would be acceptable for the host to allow the project to be implemented. Second,
a funding problem: since multiple parties will benefit from the project implementation, there is
inherent room for free-riding. Contribution rules must aim at securing a budget that is sufficient
to cover the implementation and compensation costs of the project. We borrow the mechanism
proposed by Van Essen and Walker (2017) for public goods provision to tackle these problems.
In the Van Essen and Walker mechanism (vEW mechanism hereafter), each player i submits her
maximum intended contribution per project unit ci, and the maximum quantity of the project qi
that she is willing to accept. The mechanism then selects the lowest qi from the profile of maximum
desired quantities. Then, the mechanism validates that the sum of contributions per unit is at least
as large as the cost per unit of the project. The simplicity of this mechanism is summarized by the
following message describing any individual strategy:
“I will agree to the provision of any amount of the project that is not greater than qi units,
as long as my contribution does not exceed ci for each unit.”
The vEW mechanism has two useful properties in the context of providing noxious projects.
First, the proposed contribution per project unit ci can be negative (i.e., a subsidy). This property
allows the host to request a compensation. Second, a proposed quantity qi = 0 will prevent the
implementation of the project. This property grants that every player, but in particular the host,
can veto the project.
Although the mechanism is, in theory, simple to grasp, its implementation in the laboratory
offers an initial testing ground for its performance. In particular, the efficient provision of noxious
goods is tightly connected to how veto power is employed. Experimental tests of asymmetric veto
power in redistribution games (i.e., without opportunities to increase the surplus) have shown that
veto power is actively employed (Kagel et al., 2010). In our game, the excessive use of veto power
will block efficient allocations; but if veto power is underused, or the threats of using veto power
are non-credible, the redistribution of the surplus will be limited.
In our experimental setting, participants are randomly assigned to groups of three players.
Two group members derive a net benefit from the public project; and the third one is the host of
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the noxious facility, who results harmed if the project quantity is not too small. We framed this
problem as the collective decision between the representatives of three Cities, A, B and C (one city
per player), regarding the construction of a waste incinerator. City C is predefined as the host of
this facility. Participants must submit the maximum quantity of the project that they are willing
to support, and the maximum contribution (or minimum requested compensation) per unit of the
public project. Given the novelty of this mechanism, we are interested in understanding whether
its users are able to attain efficient implementations; and, conditional of project provision, we ex-
plore whether players use their veto power to exploit the redistributive nature of the mechanism.
We find that 66% of the group interactions led to a positive provision level of the public project.
However, the efficient quantity, based on the Lindahl Equilibrium prediction, was reached only
in 5% of the interactions. We added communication as a between-subjects treatment variation
by letting players chat with their teammates during the entire round. We find that, although the
probability of positive provision only increased to 68%, the efficient quantity was reached in 37%
of the interactions. Moreover, the provided quantity relative to the efficient level increased from
53% to 79% in the treatment with communication.
This study contributes to three strands of the literature. First, we use mechanism design in
setting the quantity (or size) of a noxious facility. So far, mechanism design applied to the provi-
sion of noxious goods have employed auctions to answer where to locate a project, but not on how
large the project should be (Jackson and Moulin, 1992; Kleindorfer and Sertel, 1994; Kunreuther
and Kleindorfer, 1986; Kunreuther et al., 1987; O’Sullivan, 1993).1 More recent studies explore the
informational requirements of these auctions (Lescop, 2007), and how to induce interim and ex
post voluntary participation (Minehart and Neeman, 2002).
The experimental evidence on the use of auctions for locating noxious facilities is scarce. Kun-
reuther et al. (1987) proposed an auction in which the party with the lowest bid, representing its
willingness to accept (WTA) is selected as host, and each one of the non-selected parties paid an
equal share 1/(N − 1) of the WTA as compensation. The accompanying experiment reveals that
learning plays an important role: some rounds are required to guarantee that the auction winner
is the player with the lowest provision costs. Quah and Yong (2008) evaluate four different mech-
anisms in terms of efficiency and revenue. They find that, from an efficiency perspective, the best
performer is the second-price auction and the worst performer is the all-pay second-price auction.
We contribute to this literature by implementing an alternative mechanism that focuses on the
compensation problem as a function of the size of the allowed noxious facility. We observe that,
despite the bi-dimensional nature of requests (i.e., a maximum contribution per unit and a maxi-
1Even the acronyms employed to refer to this problem, NIMBY and LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use), evoke the
spatial nature of this situation (Popper, 1983; Schively, 2007).
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mum allowed quantity), positive provisions occur in two-thirds of the interactions. We interpret
this result as evidence that the mechanism was sufficiently tractable, and this is confirmed by our
analysis of the chat logs.
Second, our study contributes to the institutional design of participatory processes by endow-
ing with political power the hosting communities affected by noxious projects. A notorious exam-
ple are the “Free, Prior and Informed Consultations,” or FPIC processes, which have consolidated
as representation mechanisms in Latin American countries demanding the approval of vulnerable
groups before large-scale resource extraction projects can take place (Fontana and Grugel, 2016).
FPIC processes were conceived as protective and compensatory mechanisms. However, they of-
ten stagnate in legal procedures, failing to accomplish their ultimate goal of reducing power asym-
metries (Rodrı´guez-Garavito, 2011). The tension between achieving optimal compensations and
allocating the decision power is also innate to the vEW mechanism, and learning about how these
forces balance in a controlled setting is useful to conceive transparent mechanisms that give voice
to vulnerable groups (e.g., indigenous or afro-descendent populations) demanding compensa-
tions. We find that veto threats are rarely used and, as a result, most of the efficiency gains from
the mechanism are kept by the players who benefit from a larger noxious facility.
Third, our study adds evidence to the experimental literature exploring mechanisms that, the-
oretically, can achieve Lindahl efficiency (Smith, 1979, 1980; Banks et al., 1988; Chen, 2008). Van Es-
sen et al. (2012) compare the dynamic properties of three mechanisms, proposed by Walker et al.
(1981), Kim (1993), and Chen (2002). Whereas the Kim and Chen mechanisms produce 70-95% of
the consumer surplus achieved in equilibrium, behaving better than the Walker mechanism, the
Kim mechanism produced fewer violations of individual rationality and budget imbalances were
less costly. More recently, Van Essen and Walker (2019) show that the vEW mechanism performs
at least as well as the Chen mechanism.
We contribute by testing the vEW mechanism, which can achieve Lindahl efficiency, in a con-
text of a larger asymmetry in valuation between the project host and those who benefit from a
larger project size. We find that the consumer surplus with respect to the Lindahl outcome is 35%
for the for the host, and 94% for the non-host players. We also find that non-binding communica-
tion, an institution relatively inexpensive to provide that is efficiency-enhancing in public goods
games (Isaac and Walker, 1988) and promotes redistribution in bilateral bargaining (Roth, 1995;
Andreoni and Rao, 2011), increases the surplus with respect to the Lindahl outcome to 56% for the
player hosting the facility, and 105% for the non-hosting players.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the game setting to study the provision of
the noxious facility, and explains the vEW mechanism and its properties. Section 3 describes the
experimental set up, as well as the experimental variations and hypotheses. Section 4 presents the
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results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The van Essen and Walker mechanism
A set of η players must decide how many units q of a public project they will provide, and how
much they will pay for this project. To do so, each player i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , η}, makes a proposal
ζi = (qi, ci) where qi is the maximum number of project units she is willing to accept, and ci is the
maximum contribution per unit of the public project that she is willing to provide. Given a budget
e, the proposal ζi must be such that qi × ci ≤ e. The input of the vEW mechanism is the profile of
proposals ζ = ((q1, c1), . . . , (qη , cη)), yielding:
q =
min{q1, . . . , qη} if ∑
η
i=1 ci ≥ φ
0, otherwise,
(1)
and
pi = φ/n + ci − c¯ with c¯ = 1/n
η
∑
j=1
cj (2)
Where φ is the cost of providing one unit of the project. Since pi is the contribution per unit
made by player i, the total contribution when q units of the public project are provided will be
Ti = pi × q.
Van Essen and Walker (2017) remark that every outcome of this mechanism is acceptable, in
and out of equilibrium. Acceptability rests in two conditions. For every player: (i) contribu-
tions per project unit should not exceed the intended contribution; and (ii) the provided quantity
should not exceed the desired quantity of the project. The latter condition relates to the veto power
granted to every participant, since the mechanism selects the minimum of all proposed quantities.
In our game, this feature is particularly important for the project host, who can block a project by
setting qi = 0.
In addition to acceptability, other important properties of the mechanism that are relevant to
our study are: (iii) the mechanism is budget balanced, (iv) a Nash equilibrium of this mechanism
is individually rational, and (v) the Lindahl outcome is an equilibrium outcome. For a detailed
discussion of these properties see Van Essen and Walker (2017) and Van Essen and Walker (2019).
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2.2 Game setting to study the provision of a noxious good
Three players face the problem of providing q units of a public project. Players 1 and 2, which are
symmetric, are of Type B, as they benefit from the public project. Player 3 is of Type H, as she will
host the noxious facility associated to the project. The valuation of providing q units of this project
for a Type i player is given by vi(q) = aiq− q2 for i ∈ {B, H}. We set the parameters as aB = 14,
and aH = 2, to accentuate the differential character of the public project for Type B players, who
benefit from its provision; and for the Type H player, who results harmed if any quantity q ≥ 3
is provided. All three players receive an endowment of e = 30 and face the same costs function
Φ(q) = φq, with a unit cost φ = 6.
The total surplus is given by
S(q) = 2(vB) + vH −Φ(q) = 24q− 3q2 (3)
The maximization of Eq. 3 yields the Pareto optimal provision of the public project, q∗ = 4.
The associated Lindahl tax per unit of public project for Type i, τi, is given by setting the marginal
rate of substitution, ai − 2q, equal to the marginal cost of the public project, φ. We thus obtain
τB = 6 and τH = −6. Therefore, Type B players pay a tax TB = 6× 4 = 24 each, for the provision
of q∗ = 4 units of the public project, and the Type H player receives (−)TH = (−)6× 4 = (−)24
as compensation, given q∗.
If players would have taken decentralized provision decisions, the predicted quantity would
have halved with respect to the optimal level (i.e., q = q∗/2 = 2). Note that, for the Type H
player, the costs of project provision exceeded its benefits for any value of q and therefore she will
not contribute. With the response of Type H Player in mind, the two symmetric Type B players
maximize 14(2qB)− (2qB)2 − 6(2qB), yielding q∗B = 2.
The mechanism solution
Following Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 in Van Essen and Walker (2017), the unique Pareto Efficient Nash
equilibrium outcome and the unique strong Nash equilibrium outcome is the Lindahl outcome.
The two Type B players will submit a contribution of cB = 6 per unit of public project, and will
propose a quantity of (at least) qB = 4 project units. The Type H player will submit a negative
contribution (i.e., she will request a compensation) of cH = −6 per unit of public project, and will
propose a quantity of qH = 4 project units.
The profile of proposals ζ = ((q1, c1), (q2, c2), (q3, c3)) will be ζ = ((q1 ≥ 4, 6), (q2 ≥ 4, 6), (4,−6)).
Regardless of the values of q1 and q2, the minimum quantity will be q3 = 4, hence q∗ = 4. The
sum of contributions per project unit will exactly cover φ. Given that φ/n = c¯, using Eq. 2 we
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Table 1: Experimental parameters and equilibrium outcomes of the vEW mechanism
Player Type ai q∗i qi ci pi q
∗ T∗i pii(q
∗, T∗i ) pii(0, 0)
1 B 14 2 ≥ 4 6 6 4 24 46 30
2 B 14 2 ≥ 4 6 6 4 24 46 30
3 H 2 0 4 -6 -6 4 -24 46 30
For player i, q∗i corresponds to the decentralized solution, qi to the requested quantity in the vEW mechanism, ci to the
maximum intended contribution per project unit, pi to the actual contribution per project unit, q∗ and T∗i to the Lindahl
equilibrium quantity and total tax (respectively), and pii to the payoff.
know that each player will pay her intended contribution per unit, or pi = ci. The contribution
per unit is identical to the Lindahl tax, pB = τB = 6 and pH = τH = −6. This yields a total tax (or
compensation) equal to Ti = piq, and the payoff will be given by pii = e− Ti + vi(q).
Our parameterization grants that, if the Lindahl allocation is implemented, payoffs are identi-
cal for the Type B and Type H players (piB(q∗, T∗B) = piH(q
∗, T∗H) = 46). This is very useful to avoid
an efficiency-equality trade-off that might confound motives for selected actions. Table 1 displays
the parameter values, optimal strategies and outcomes in equilibrium when using this mecha-
nism. Note that payoffs are also equal when the project is not provided (piB(0, 0) = piH(0, 0) = 30),
and these payoffs are identical to the endowment.
3 The experiment
3.1 Experimental set up
We designed and conducted an experiment that emulates the game setting described in Section
2.2. To ease the interpretation and purpose of the mechanism, the instructions were framed as a
problem of building a waste incinerator (see Appendices A.1 and A.2 for instructions in English
and Spanish, respectively). Participants were told that each one of them represented a city. The
two Type B players were assigned to the labels of “City A” and “City B.” The Type H player
represented “City C.” We randomly assigned participants to a label, and then to groups of three
players. The labels and groups remained fixed for the ten rounds comprised in the experiment.
In our framing, the National Government suggested to Cities A, B, and C the construction of
a waste incinerator that will benefit the three cities. Due to a external restriction the incinerator
could only be built in City C. Cities A and B have millions of inhabitants, and would benefit
from a large incinerator. By contrast, City C is much smaller, and therefore a small incinerator is
preferred. Besides, the environmental costs, increasing in the size of the incinerator, are burdened
by City C.
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Table 2: Benefits of the public project shown to participants in the experiment
Benefits Burning Towers in the Incinerator (Q)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
City A 0 13 24 33 40 45 48 49 48 45 40
City B 0 13 24 33 40 45 48 49 48 45 40
City C 0 1 0 -3 -8 -15 -24 -35 -48 -63 -80
The “size” of the waste incinerator is given by the number of burning towers it has. Partici-
pants can propose any number of burning towers between 0 and 10 (i.e., qi ∈ {0, . . . , 10}). Table 2,
describing the benefits (or harms) of the incinerator for each City as a function of q, was available
to all three group members from the beginning of the experiment. The values reported in this
table were computed based on the parameterization described in Section 2.2.
Given the complexity of the game, the first three rounds were practice rounds. One of the
remaining seven rounds was randomly selected for payment. All the participants within a group
were paid based on the same selected round. The currency in the experiment were tokens. Players
were told that the amounts of tokens earned in the round selected for payment will be multiplied
by COP 1,000 to compute their earnings.2 Note also that Type H participants may end up with
negative earnings if they submit qi > q∗ and ci > 0. In the instructions we explained that negative
payoffs were rare but possible, and they could be easily avoided by carefully reading how the
mechanism works.
3.2 Timing of the experiment
i) Introduction. Participants read the general instructions of the experiment and signed the
informed consent.
ii) Validation. Participants responded to a validation test to check their understanding of the
mechanism (see Appendix A.3). The test consisted on three scenarios with a total of ten
questions about mechanism outcomes and participants’ contributions and payoffs. In case
of a mistake, the program provided the correct response with the corresponding explanation.
iii) Submission. [Rounds 1-10] Participants submit their proposal ζi = (qi, ci). Each participant
has 120 seconds to submit her proposal. The default proposal, applied when the player did
not submit any ζi, was ζ0i = (0, 0).
2By the time of the experiment, USD 1 was equivalent to COP 3,360.
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iv) Resolution. [Rounds 1-10] Participants received feedback on the outcome of the mechanism
(i.e., provided quantity, sum of contributions, total paid tax) and their own payoff.
v) Payment. [After Round 10] Participants received a summary of their payoffs in each round,
and they were informed about the selected round for payment and their final earnings.
3.3 Experimental design and hypotheses
We are interested in the efficiency (via quantities) and redistributive potential (via taxes) of the
mechanism in the context of providing a continuous noxious facility. This provision is subject to
two types of failures: underprovision (i.e., q < q∗); and insufficient contributions (i.e.,∑ηi=1 ci < φ).
We define two treatments:
• Baseline: participants interact under the conditions described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
• (with) Chat: in the submission stage (see Section 3.2), participants have a chat box located
above the submission box. Participants are instructed to talk about their proposals “in terms
of quantities (Q) and contributions (P > 0) or compensations (P < 0)”.
We explore whether communication serves an efficiency-enhancing role within this mecha-
nism throughout two types of messages: first, Type H players can request larger compensations
per unit in exchange for increasing the allowed project quantity; second, Type B players can en-
sure that their contributions are sufficient. Our first two hypotheses, associated to the submitted
contributions and allowed quantities, read as follows:
(H1) The absolute value of proposed contributions (|ci|) is larger in the Chat treatment than in the
Baseline.
(H2) The proposed quantities from Type H players (qHi ) are larger in the Chat treatment compared
to the Baseline.
In H1 we use the absolute value to reflect the idea that Type B players should contribute more,
in response to the larger compensations requested by the Type H player (i.e., more negative values
of ci). These larger compensations should be accompanied, in theory, by an increase in the project
quantity that a Type H player will allow, as stated in H2. In H2 we do not hypothesize about the
quantities proposed by Type B players because the mechanism selects the minimum qi, which is
expected to be provided by the Type H group member.
The other two hypotheses are related to the extensive and the intensive margin in the project
provision:
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(H3) The probability of a positive provision (i.e., q > 0) is higher in the Chat treatment compared
to the Baseline.
(H4) The provided quantity of public project, q, is higher in the Chat treatment compared to the
Baseline.
In H3 we hypothesize that allowing group members to communicate decreases the likelihood
of insufficient contributions given a minimum desired project quantity q. Besides, in H4 we hy-
pothesize that communication also gives players the opportunity to reach agreements with larger
contributions compensating larger project quantities.
As a final comment, note that (H4) is not a mechanic result of (H2). Type H players might
agree to increase the proposed quantity, but their requested compensations could be larger than
the contributions of Type B players.
3.4 Sample and implementation
The experiment was conducted in the Rosario Experimental and Behavioral Economics Lab -
REBEL, in Bogota´ (Colombia), in September 2019. The experiment was programmed and imple-
mented using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). We conducted six sessions with 132 participants in total.
In each treatment we had two sessions with 24 participants, and one session with 18 participants.
The average payment was COP 38,340 (std. dev. 9,147). This payment was equivalent to USD 11.4
at the time of the experiment.
For this experiment we only recruited undergraduate students from the Economics Depart-
ment at Universidad del Rosario. We employed this selected sample for two reasons. First, nu-
meracy skills are important in this experiment to prevent underprovision, insufficiency of contri-
butions and negative payoffs based on the misunderstanding of the rules. Second, the framing
of the experiment might be particularly appealing for undergraduate students in Economics, in-
creasing the attention paid to the instructions. Given the novelty of the experimental paradigm
we wanted to reduce sources for failures of the mechanism associated to a misunderstanding of
the rules or boredom.
4 Results
We report first the submitted proposals ζi = (qi, ci) with and without communication. This is
followed by an analysis of the outcomes of the mechanism in terms of efficiency and redistribution.
Then, we explore whether inefficient provisions were mostly due to insufficient contributions or
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Submitted Prices and Quantities
Proposed Contributions Proposed Quantities
Type B Type H Type B Type H
Mean 4.75 -3.42 3.69 2.92
Std. Dev. 3.25 4.42 1.59 1.39
Median 5 -4 4 3
Treatment Comparison
Baseline (mean) 4.693 -2.732 3.936 2.632
Chat (mean) 4.809 -4.109 3.452 3.213
p-value (t-test) 0.5974 0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observations 880 440 880 440
quantity restrictions (including vetoed proposals). In the last part of the section we analyze chat
logs to gain insight into how players interacted with the mechanism.
4.1 Proposed contributions and quantities
Table 3 reports the proposed contributions and quantities by player type. Type B players propose
to contribute, on average, 4.75 ±3.25 tokens per unit of public project.3 The bottom part of the
table reveals that the average proposed contribution by Type B players does not differ with and
without communication, even if we use an overpowered t−test assuming statistical independence
of observations. Type H players request, on average, 3.42 tokens ±4.42 per unit of public project.
The differences between treatments reveal that allowing communication increased the average
tokens requested by Type H players by 1.37 tokens. Although this difference appears to be statis-
tically significant, we withhold any conclusions until the regression analysis reported at the end
of this section.
Figure 1 complements this analysis by displaying the distributions of proposed contributions
between treatments (in each panel) and between player types (one type per panel). The left panel
confirms that the distribution of proposed contributions from Type B players is very similar with
and without communication. However, note that the likelihood of submitting the contributions
cBi = 0 and c
B
i = 7 increases at least twice with communication. These two contribution levels
appear to reflect unsuccessful and successful agreements emerging from communication, respec-
tively. The right panel reveals that Type H players request larger compensations with communica-
tion. For instance, the modal (negative) contribution cHi shifted from -3 in the baseline to -5 in the
3We will use the symbol “±” throughout the rest of the paper for displaying standard deviations.
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Figure 1: Proposed contributions (ci) per unit of public project by treatment (within panels) and player
Type (between panels).
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Note: The left panel corresponds to Type B players. The right panel corresponds to Type H players. Negative con-
tributions correspond to compensation requests. We omitted the 27 intended contributions (2%) with ci < −10 or
ci > 10.
Chat treatment. Note also that compensation requests above the Lindahl predictions (cHi = −6)
occurred with a considerable high frequency (27%).
We proceed now with the analysis of proposed quantities. Table 3 reveals that Type B players
request greater quantities of public project (3.69 ±1.59) than Type H players (2.92 ±1.39). Com-
munication has opposite effects between player types: qB decreases from 3.94 to 3.45 units (-0.48),
whereas qH increases from 2.63 to 3.21 units (+0.58) in the Chat treatment with respect to the base-
line. Figure 2 reveals that the probability that Type B players requested the optimal value q∗ = 4
increased more than twice with communication. This is explained by the large drop in the proba-
bility of a request qB exceeding the optimal quantity, from 36% in the baseline to 12% in the Chat
treatment. The probability that Type H players request q∗ = 4 also increases more than twice with
communication. In this case, smaller requests qN ∈ {1, 2} shift from 53% in the baseline to 17% in
the Chat treatment.
Note also that vetoing the project is very unlikely in the baseline. With communication, the
decision seems to arise more often from Type B players, not from Type H players. We will explore
12
Figure 2: Proposed quantities (qi) by treatment (within panels) and player Type (between panels).
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Note: The left panel corresponds to Type B players. The right panel corresponds to Type H players.
later this result in detail.
We present a regression analysis using a random effects model for two outcomes yigr: proposed
contributions cigr and proposed quantities qigr of each participant i, in group g, interacting in
round r. Standard errors were clustered at the participant level and at the group level in separate
regressions. We included round fixed effects in all models, as well as group fixed effects in the
even-numbered models. We excluded the three practice rounds (1 to 3) from the analysis. The
model is given by:
yigr = β0 + β1Chatg + β2Type Big + β3Chatg × Type Big + δr + δg + eigr (4)
The variable Chatg indicates the treatment assignment (Chat or baseline condition), and Type Bi
indicates whether individual i was playing as Type B or Type H. Group and round fixed effects
are captured in δg and δr, respectively.
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients. We focus first on model (1). In the baseline, Type
H players request on average 3.15 tokens, and Type B players propose an average contribution
of (7.75 - 3.15) = 4.6 tokens. Communication increases the average requests of Type H players
by 1.45 tokens, and the proposed contributions of Type B players by 1.72 tokens. Model (2) adds
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Table 4: Random effects regression for proposed contributions and quantities
VARIABLES Proposed Contributions Proposed Quantities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chat -1.448∗∗ -2.288◦◦◦ 0.617∗ 0.719◦◦
(0.718) (2.389) (0.322) (0.906)
[0.723] [0.656] [0.324] [0.286]
Type B 7.750∗∗∗ 7.750∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.513) (0.319) (0.307)
[0.616] [0.630] [0.374] [0.383]
Chat x Type B 1.718∗+ 1.718∗+ -1.006∗∗ -1.006∗∗+
(0.811) (0.751) (0.409) (0.346)
[0.961] [0.984] [0.419] [0.429]
Constant -3.152∗∗∗ -3.186◦◦◦ 2.848∗∗∗ 2.998∗∗∗
(0.484) (2.202) (0.276) (0.878)
[0.522] [0.548] [0.306] [0.325]
Round Fixed Effects 3 3 3 3
Group Fixed Effects 7 3 7 3
Observations 924 924 924 924
Number of ID 132 132 132 132
Standard errors clustered at the participant level in parentheses and at the group level in brackets. Statistically signifi-
cant when clustering at the participant and group level: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Statistically significant when
clustering at the participant but not at the group level: +++ p <0.01, ++ p <0.05, + p <0.1. Statistically significant
when clustering at the group but not at the participant level: ◦◦◦ p <0.01, ◦◦ p <0.05, ◦ p <0.1. Practice rounds (1 to 3)
are excluded from the analysis.
group fixed effects. The effect of communication on the compensations requested by Type H
players increases in this specification. Since this effect is statistically significant when the standard
errors are clustered at the group level, but not at the participant level, we interpret that the role of
communication is highly group dependent, and not all Type H players benefit from it.
We now focus on model (3) to explore the requested quantities qi. In the baseline Type H
players proposed on average 2.8 project units, and Type B players proposed 1.2 additional project
units. As we previously mention, communication increased the quantities proposed by Type H
players (+0.62 units) and decreased the quantities proposed by Type B players (-1.00 unit). Adding
group fixed effects, in model (4), have negligible effects on the estimated coefficients. The effect is
only significant when the standard errors are clustered at the group level.
Summing up, communication increases Type B’s intended contributions and Type H’s re-
quested compensations, providing support for H1. Nonetheless, the effects of communication
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Table 5: Outcomes of the vEW Mechanism: provision, taxes, earnings, and comparisons to the Lindahl
outcome: q∗ = 4, T∗B = 24, T∗H = −24, and pi∗(q∗, T∗i ) = 46. The reported quantities and taxes are
conditional on a positive provision of the project (q > 0). Practice rounds (1 to 3) are excluded.
Baseline Chat Diff. Obs.
Probability that project is provided 65.6% 68.2% 2.6% 308
Project Units 2.16 3.23 1.07 206
Provision relative to Lindahl (q/q∗) 54.0% 80.8% 26.8%
Type B Tax 9.77 16.72 6.94 412
Type B Tax relative to Lindahl (TB/T∗B) 40.7% 69.7% 29.0%
Type H Tax (Subsidy) -6.59 -14.07 -7.47 204
Type H Tax (Subsidy) relative to Lindahl (TH/T∗H) 27.5% 58.6% 31.1%
Earnings Type B 45.3 46.8 1.7 412
Type B Surplus (piB − e)/(pi∗ − e) 94.4% 105.0% 10.6%
Earnings Type H 35.6 38.9 3.3 204
Type H Surplus (piH − e)/(pi∗ − e) 35.0% 55.6% 20.6%
appear to be heterogeneous among groups. We also find that communication increased the project
quantity requested by Type H players, as we predicted in H2. However, we did not anticipate that
communication would trigger the opposite response among Type B players. We hypothesize that
Type B players reduce the requested project quantity aiming to match the Type H player request,
in order to simplify the computations of the required compensation.
In the following section we explore whether the observed submissions ζi = (qi, ci) lead to
more efficient outcomes, in the extensive (i.e., probability of project provision) and intensive (i.e.,
provided quantity) margins.
4.2 Outcomes of the mechanism
Table 5 reports four outcomes of interest from the mechanism. We start with the two group out-
comes: whether the public project was provided, and how many units were provided. Then, we
proceed with the two individual outcomes: the tax amount paid (or subsidy received) by player
type, and the earnings by player type. We also report the relative provided quantity q/q∗ and paid
taxes Ti/T∗i with respect to the Lindahl outcome. Similarly, we report the surplus generated with
respect to the no provision scenario, in which pii(0, 0) = e.
The probability of project provision in the baseline is 65.6%, and communication increases this
probability by 2.6 percentage points. This difference, is not statistically significant (p−value of a
Chi-squared test is 0.628). The remaining outcomes displayed in the table are reported conditional
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Figure 3: Produced units of public project (by treatment).
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on having a positive provision (q > 0).
The provided quantity increases by 1.07 units when players are allowed to chat. Relative to
the efficient provision level q∗ = 4, the additional quantity represents an increase of 27 percentage
points. Figure 3 reveals that the modal provision is q = 2 (occurring 46.5% of the times) in the
baseline, whereas in the Chat treatment the modal provision is q∗ = 4 (occurring 41.9% of the
times). Without communication, this optimal provision occurs in 5.9% of the outcomes.
We shift now to the individual outcomes of the mechanism. Table 5 reveals that, in the baseline,
Type B players paid a tax of 9.8 tokens (4.5/unit), equivalent to 41% of the Lindahl tax; whereas
Type H players receive a compensation of 6.6 tokens (3.1/unit), equivalent to 28% of the Lindahl
tax. With communication, the tax paid by Type B players increases to 16.7 tokens (5.2/unit), or 70%
of the Lindahl tax; whereas the compensation received by Type H players increased to 14.1 tokens
(4.4/unit), or 59% of the Lindahl tax. The different distance, by player type, to the optimal taxation
levels becomes evident when looking at the attained surplus. Whereas the average earnings of
Type B players are very close the Lindahl predictions, the average earnings of Type H players are
farther from this benchmark. This result makes evident that the redistributive potential of this
mechanism is not fully exploited by the host of the facility.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of taxes per treatment and per player type. The comparison
within each panel confirms that communication increased the absolute value of the tax. Note that
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Figure 4: Distribution of taxes by treatment (within panels) and player type (between panels).
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communication creates a bimodal pattern in the distribution of taxes for the Type H player (see
right panel). This result suggests that for some outcomes with positive provision, the Type H
player accepted agreements in which she was neither contributing nor receiving a compensation.
We can separate the increase in taxes observed in the Chat treatment into two components.
First, the provision costs face an average increase of 1.07 φ, given the corresponding increase in
the provided quantity. Second, the remaining additional taxes paid by Type B players cover the
larger compensation requested by the Type H players for allowing a larger project quantity q.
Figure 5 reports the tax paid per unit, for the produced quantities q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.4 This metric
allows us to focus on the compensation component. On the left panel we observe that, in the
baseline, for q ∈ {1, 2, 3} the average tax per unit paid by Type B players is virtually identical. By
contrast, in the Chat treatment we observe a positive correlation between q and TB. The expected
opposite pattern is observed on the right panel for the average compensations received by Type
H players, for which we observe a negative correlation between q and TN .
Note also that the median TN for q = 2 is zero. This result reflects the bimodal pattern previ-
ously observed in the distribution of TN . Now it is clear that it occurs precisely when the Type H
player receives no harm or benefit from the project (recall from Table 2 that vH(2) = 0).
4They account for 98% of all outcomes involving q > 0.
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Figure 5: Tax per unit of public project by treatment (within panels) and player type (between panels).
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We conducted a regression analysis taking as outcomes the variables listed in Table 5. The
model is similar to the specification displayed in Eq. 4, except that for the group outcomes we
do not include group fixed effects. Table 6 reports the regression results. We confirm that com-
munication does not increase the probability of a positive provision of the project, but it increases
the provided quantity q by 1.05 units (or 55%). We do not find evidence supporting H3, but we
validate that communication has an effect in the intensive margin of project provision, as stated in
H4.
We now turn our attention on individual outcomes. Model (3) shows that communication
increases the total tax paid by Type B players by 14.9 tokens, whereas the total compensation
received by Type H players increases by 5.9 tokens (about 83% with respect to the baseline). Al-
though these effects are large and significant, the lack of a statistically significant effect for com-
munication in Model (4) suggests that most of the additional tax covers the additional project cost
per unit φ, not larger compensations. Finally, Model (5) reveals that communication increases the
average earnings from Type H players by 5.7 tokens, without significantly reducing the earnings
from Type B players.
Recall that our parameterization granted equal payoffs under the Lindahl allocation, and also
when the project is not provided. This makes even more puzzling that in the observed non-
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Table 6: Random effects regression for outcomes of the vEW mechanism
VARIABLES Project
Provision
Quantity Total tax Tax per
unit
Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Chat 0.0260 1.045*** -5.935** -1.180 5.653**
(0.0613) (0.273) (2.821) (0.800) (2.379)
Type A 16.18*** 7.775*** 9.172***
(2.207) (0.736) (1.898)
Chat × Type A 14.92*** 1.770 -2.392
(4.252) (1.200) (3.569)
Constant 0.692*** 1.906*** -7.134*** -3.183*** 35.55***
(0.0740) (0.162) (1.490) (0.490) (1.344)
Observations 308 206 618 618 618
Groups (or subjects) in cluster 44 44 132 132 132
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. For group outcomes, in Models 1 and 2, errors are clustered at the group
level. For individual outcomes, in Models 3 to 5, errors are clustered at the subjects level and group fixed effects are
included. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Practice rounds (1 to 3) are excluded from the analyses.
equilibrium outcomes, most of the surplus is kept by Type B players. A potential explanation
is that Type B players use q = 2 as reference point because vB(2) = 24 and vN(2) = 0. If they
successfully convince Type H player to accept this reference point they can deter the use of veto
power. In Section 4.3 we analyze in detail the reasons for failed provisions, and in Section 4.4 we
explore the chat logs to obtain more insights on how players interacted with the mechanism.
4.3 Failed provisions
In this Section we explore in detail what occurred in the interactions in which the project was
not provided. Let us start by describing the rare use of veto power. In the baseline, only 9.4%
(5/53) of the failed provisions correspond to vetoing quantities. In the Chat treatment, this figure
increases to 38.8% (19/49). Surprisingly, the use of veto was more widespread among Type B
than among Type H players. In the baseline all five reports correspond to Type B players. With
communication, Type B players exerted veto power 6.8% of the times (21 of 308 requests) and Type
H players exerted veto power 3.9% of the times (6 of 154 requests). Neither of these differences is
statistically significant.5
We now explore insufficient contributions, which correspond to 91% of all failed provisions
5The comparison between player types in the baseline using a Chi-squared test yields a p−value 0.112, and the
comparison between player types in the Chat treatment yields a p−value 0.207).
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Figure 6: Total contributions from the three group members. Colored dots (red and blue in the baseline
and chat treatments, respectively) represent sufficient contributions (i.e., ∑ ci ≥ 6), and gray dots represent
insufficient contributions.
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Note: Total contributions displayed for q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, which represent 98% of provisions.
in the baseline, and to 61% of all failed provisions in the Chat treatment. Figure 6 displays the
distribution of successful (in color) and failed (in gray) total contributions per group. The thicker
the gray distribution plots in the vicinity of ∑i ci = 6, the more evident the coordination fail-
ure. A comparison between panels reveals that, as one would expect, these coordination failures
were more prevalent in the baseline. Note also that for q = 3 the dispersion of insufficient total
contributions is the largest. This pattern suggests that the insufficient funding was not the result
of coordination failures, but rather more profound disagreements regarding compensations and
contributions. On the other hand, the colored distributions reveal that, when the project was pro-
vided, contributions typically exceeded the required 6 tokens, specially for q = 1 and q = 2. By
contrast, for q = 4 the majority of total contributions were exactly ∑i ci = 6.
4.4 Analysis of chat logs
In this Section we study the content of chat logs to gain further insights on how players interact
with the mechanism. We started by coding individual chat entries according to the procedure
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described in Appendix B.1, sorting messages into twenty-five categories defined as “ message
types”.6 We aggregated this information at the group×round level using an indicator variable
taking the value of one if, for a given round, at least one message matched the corresponding
category. Table A.1 reports the percentage of occurrence of the twenty-five message types, and
its correlation with the probability of q > 0 in that round. We describe below the most relevant
patterns.
First, veto threats from City C are uncommon, occurring only in 2% of the interactions. By
contrast, City C was more active proposing compensations. It was 1.9 times more likely that City
C made a request (39%), compared to the likelihood that City A/B asked City C for his approval of
a given proposal (20.1%). We also highlight that in 10.4% of group interactions, City A/B explicitly
talks about “compensating” City C.
Second, proposals made to City A or B, or both, occurred in 40.9% of the interactions; propos-
als made to City C occurred in 24% of the interactions, and proposals made to all three players
occurred in 13% of the interactions. These proposals lead to non-binding agreements 21% of the
times.
Third, game history is also frequent in chat interactions. It includes asking about the past
round actions or outcomes (18%), revealing private information from the past round’s payoff
(20%), proposals to follow the same actions from a past round (20%), and complaining about a
past outcome (16%). By contrast, players rarely reveal past choices (3%).
Fourth, requests with respect to past actions were rare. The most frequent message of this
type is to try a different strategy and “see what happens” (8.4%). This is followed by requests to
increase the contributions (6.5%) or increase the quantities (4.5%). Only in 0.6% of the cases there
was a suggestion to decrease quantities. In some few cases there were mentions that some specific
strategies would make that everyone wins (3.2%), or make that everyone loses (2.6%).
We also find that a rebate was mentioned in 3.2% of the interactions. We realized that a strategy
emerging in a group was to promote a total contribution per unit that was above the required
6 tokens, under the argument that excess contributions will be given back. Although this is a
mechanic consequence of the budget balancing property, this confusion gives room to free-riding
strategies that were not exploited by participants.
Only two message types were correlated with having q > 0: reaching a non-binding agree-
ment (ρ = 0.212), and complaining about a previous round outcome (ρ = -0.153). We conduct
a Lasso regression as a variable selection exercise to further understand which variables, when
6Since we limit the analysis to rounds 4 to 10 we dropped an additional category corresponding to mentions of being
in a practice (or unpaid) round.
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Table 7: Estimates for the probability of provision (q > 0) based on chat messages. Selection of covariates
based on the AIC of a LASSO model.
Message type OLS Random Effects
Non-binding agreement 0.199*** (0.066) 0.202*** (0.066)
Veto threat -0.382 (0.259) -0.496* (0.275)
Suggest an increase in q -0.327* (0.172) -0.295* (0.170)
Mention that a strategy “makes everyone to win” -0.268* (0.159) -0.254 (0.157)
A player reveals her past payoff -0.084* (0.043) -0.084* (0.044)
Question about agreements or requests -0.066** (0.033) -0.0603* (0.034)
Constant 0.738*** (0.048) 0.733*** (0.060)
Observations 154 154
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Practice rounds (1 to 3) are excluded from the analysis.
put together, are the best predictors of q > 0.7 Table 7 reports the regression coefficients for the
variables selected by the Lasso model. The coefficients (and their significance) for the estimated
OLS and random effects models are similar. Non-binding agreements increase in 20 percentage
points the probability of provision. The remaining covariates negatively impact the probability of
provision. Note that veto threats reduce by at least 38 percentage points the probability of provi-
sion, and suggesting an increase in the project quantity reduces the probability of provision in at
least 30 percentage points.
We perform an additional classification based on the content of all chat messages in a given
round rather than on individual chat entries. We defined them as “chat outcomes” and divide
our classifications into two groups. We report in Table A.2 the percentage of occurrence of each
chat outcome, and its correlation with the probability of q > 0. The first group refers to the use
of communication. We find that City C did not reveal her intended compensation in 11.7% of the
interactions. We also find that in 14.2% of the interactions at least one of the group members did
not use the chat. In the majority of these cases none of the players chatted (6.5%), followed by the
cases in which only City C chatted (4.5%). The second group refers to unfeasible agreements: in 7%
of the cases a player noted that the agreement was unfeasible given the proposed contributions,
but these unfeasible agreements went unnoticed 4.5% of the times.
7A Lasso model performs a variable selection procedure by introducing a penalty in the optimization problem. This
penalty in the lasso model corresponds to the absolute value of the coefficients, and is multiplied by a tuning parameter
λ. This shrinkage penalty can reduce the weight of a coefficient up to zero, making operational the variable selection
capability of the model (Tibshirani, 2011).
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5 Concluding remarks
We adapted the public goods provision mechanism proposed by Van Essen and Walker to the
problem of providing a noxious good in a lab experiment. The setting was framed as the provision
of a waste incinerator, with a predetermined location for this facility. The provision problem
dwells on defining the project size, taking into account that the host will demand a compensation
to not block the project provision, and that this compensation is increasing in the facility size.
The vEW mechanism is useful in this context for two reasons. First, its compensatory nature is
embedded in the fact that intended contributions can be negative. That is, the host can request a
compensation while the rest of users submit their contributions. Second, every member can set
the maximum project size that she would allow. In other words, every user has veto power.
The mechanism operates in a simple manner. If the sum of contributions per project unit is
sufficient, each user of the mechanism will contribute at most her intended contribution, and the
project size will be defined by the lowest submitted quantity. The purpose of our lab experiment
was to test the functioning of this mechanism in a simple setting with three players. The two
players who benefit from a large noxious facility must submit sufficiently large contributions to
pay the building costs and the compensation requested by the third player, who acts as the host
of the facility.
We find that veto threats are seldom used by the player hosting the facility. As a consequence,
most of the efficiency gains with respect to the no provision scenario are kept by the players who
benefit from a larger noxious facility. The average taxes paid by these players are 41% of the Lin-
dahl tax. This is partly because the average provision is 54% of the efficient quantity, but also
because compensations to the host player are lower than predicted (28% with respect to the Lin-
dahl prediction). We added a treatment with the possibility that group members chat during their
decision. Communication has an efficiency-enhancing effect in the intensive margin, increasing
the provision to 81% of the efficient quantity. However, most of the additional surplus with respect
to the Lindahl allocation was kept by the players preferring a larger facility.
The analysis of chat logs yielded two additional insights. First, non-binding agreements de-
scribing players’ intended contributions increase the probability of provision by 20 percentage
points. This figure could have been larger, but in 4.5% of the observed non-binding agreements the
intended contributions were insufficient and players did not notice. Second, in roughly 12% of the
interactions, the player harmed by the project did not reveal her intended contribution. This be-
havior negatively affected the probability of provision. In further implementations of this mecha-
nism, the efficiency-enhancing role of non-binding communication should be complemented with
rules that lead all players to submit their intended contributions or compensations, and to verify
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that these satisfy the budgetary restrictions for project implementation.
Can our results shed light on the rule-crafting of participatory FPIC processes? The mecha-
nism’s rules appear to be simple enough, the transfers become more transparent, and participants
are not overusing veto power, which was a concern before its implementation. More importantly,
the multi-party character of this mechanism might ease the definition of “valid” actors, a current
problem in FPIC processes (Rodrı´guez-Garavito, 2011). However, our experiment leaves as an
open question what would happen if more than one party demands compensation, as could occur
in the presence of multiple vulnerable communities. We are not claiming that this mechanism
should replace current FPIC processes, but that some of these elements can illustrate the exist-
ing tensions between beneficiaries and project hosts, and remark the compensatory nature of this
problem.
From a methodological perspective, this mechanism is better suited for the study of asymmet-
rically valued public projects than the standard paradigms of voluntary provision of public goods
(see e.g. Ledyard, 1995). Separate information on desired contributions and quantities prevents
a confounding problem that the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism8 will have in this
context. A single decision on how much to contribute would not allow disentangling between
egoistic (i.e., free-riding) and altruistic (i.e., reduce damage on those harmed by the project) mo-
tives for underprovision of noxious projects. In our opinion, the mechanism is simple enough to
overcome the cognitive burden of submitting bi-dimensional requests (i.e., a desired quantity and
a contribution per unit) in a strategic setting.
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A Appendix: Experimental Materials
A.1 Experimental Protocol: Translated Version
Instructions
The purpose of this activity is to understand how people make economic decisions that can benefit
some and harm others. We will study this problem with a hypothetical case. Pay attention because
you will have to make decisions that will affect your earnings.
Construction of a waste incinerator
The National Government has suggested to Cities A, B and C to build a waste incinerator that
will benefit the three cities. The only place where the incinerator can be built is in City C. Cities A
and B have millions of inhabitants, so they benefit more if the incinerator to be built is larger. The
incinerator has more burning towers the larger it is. City C is much smaller, so an incinerator with
few burning towers is enough. The incinerator generates environmental costs that only affect City
C, where the incinerator must be built. The more burning towers the incinerator has, the higher
the environmental costs.
Benefits from the waste incinerator
You will make decisions for City {A,B,C}. The budget of each of the cities is 30 tokens. The
maximum number of burning towers that can be built is 10. Each burning tower costs 6 tokens. An
incinerator with more burning towers favors Cities A and B, but not City C. Given the population
of each city and the environmental costs, the benefits are different for Cities A and B over the City
C. The following table summarizes the benefits for each city:
[See Table 2]
When the values in the table are positive, the number of burning towers generates benefits to
that City. When the values in the table are negative, the number of burning towers generates costs
to that City.
Decision-making
You will make two decisions for City {A,B,C}:
1. The maximum burning towers that you would accept to be built.
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2. How many tokens are you willing to contribute for each burning tower that is built.
Your contribution can be positive, or it can be negative. A positive contribution is helping
to pay the burning tower. A negative contribution is equivalent to asking a compensation for
allowing the construction of the burning tower. Each burning tower costs 6 tokens, plus the sum
of negative contributions (or compensations). For burning towers to be built, the sum of the
contributions for each tower must be at least 6 tokens.
How is determined the number of burning towers?
Each city announces the maximum number of towers that it would accept to be built. The lowest
number of towers announced by any of the cities (the minimum) will be built. Once the number
of towers is defined, it should be verified if the contributions are sufficient:
• If the sum of contributions per tower is less than 6 tokens, the incinerator is not built.
• If the sum of the contributions per tower is exactly 6 tokens, each city pays the number of
tokens it proposed as a contribution.
• If the sum of the contributions per tower is greater than 6 tokens, each city pays a smaller
number of tokens than it proposed as a contribution.
– Each surplus token is divided equally between all cities, and this amount is refunded
to each city.
– The refund is subtracted from the maximum contribution the player in charge of the
city was willing to make.
Later we will see some examples and some questions to verify that you understood the rules
of the game. The most important aspect of this rule is that you will never pay more than what you
proposed to contribute for each tower, and that the maximum number of towers that will be built
will not exceed the number of towers that you are willing to accept.
The rule of how many towers are built, and how much each city contributes, can be summa-
rized as follows:
“I will agree to any number of burning towers that is not greater than Q units (see table), as
long as my contribution does not exceed P for each unit.”
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Communication between cities [Only in Chat treament]
During the time available to make your decisions you can communicate with the participants
who represent the other cities. You can talk about proposals in terms of quantities (Q), and con-
tributions (P positive) or compensation (P negative). When making a proposal, keep in mind that
the amount Q multiplied by your proposed contribution P cannot exceed your initial number of
tokens (30 tokens).
Earnings in each round
Your earnings will be equal to:
+ Endowed tokens
- (Contribution per burning tower) x (Burning towers)
+ Benefits from burning towers (see table)
Payments
You will play for a total of 10 rounds. In each round you will have a maximum of 2 minutes to
make your decision. The city assigned to you, as well as the participants representing the other
two cities, will be the same during the 10 rounds. Once all rounds are completed, a table will
summarize the results of all rounds.
The first 3 rounds will be practice rounds. One of the remaining 7 rounds will be randomly
selected to pay the three participants in the group: the representatives of City A, City B, and City
C. The payment will correspond to the number of tokens won, in thousands of pesos (rounded to
the nearest multiple).
Negative payoffs
Pay close attention to the instructions of the game. There is a possibility of leaving with a null
payment in case you do not understand the costs and benefits associated to the number of burning
towers. If your earnings are negative in the round selected for payment, you will leave with a null
payment. This has very little chance of happening, but it is important that you bear this in mind.
Please click to continue.
A.2 Experimental Protocol: Original (Spanish) Version
Instrucciones Generales
El propo´sito de esta actividad es entender co´mo las personas toman decisiones econo´micas que
pueden beneficiar a unos y perjudicar a otros. Vamos a estudiar este problema con un caso
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hipote´tico. Preste atencio´n porque usted tendra´ que tomar decisiones que afectara´n sus ganan-
cias por participar.
Construccio´n de un incinerador de basuras
El Gobierno Nacional ha sugerido a las Ciudades A, B y C construir un incinerador de basuras
que beneficiara´ a las tres ciudades. El u´nico lugar en que se puede construir el incinerador es en
la Ciudad C. Las Ciudades A y B tienen millones de habitantes, por lo que se benefician ma´s si
el incinerador que se va a construir es ma´s grande. El incinerador tiene ma´s torres de quemado
entre ma´s grande sea. La Ciudad C es mucho ma´s pequen˜a, por lo que un incinerador con pocas
torres de quemado le basta. El incinerador genera costos ambientales que so´lo afectan a la Ciudad
C, donde el incinerador debe ser construido. Entre ma´s torres de quemado tenga el incinerador,
mayores son los costos ambientales.
Beneficios del incinerador de basuras
Usted tomara´ decisiones por la Ciudad {A,B,C}. El presupuesto de cada una de las ciudades es
de 30 fichas. Se pueden construir hasta 10 torres de quemado. Cada torre de quemado cuesta 6
fichas. Un incinerador con ma´s torres de quemado, favorece a las Ciudades A y B, pero no a la
Ciudad C. Teniendo en cuenta la poblacio´n de cada ciudad y los costos ambientales, los beneficios
son diferentes para las Ciudades A y B respecto a la Ciudad C. La siguiente tabla resume los
beneficios para cada ciudad:
[See Table 2]
Cuando los valores de la tabla son positivos, el nu´mero de torres de quemado generan benefi-
cios a esa Ciudad. Cuando los valores de la tabla son negativos, el nu´mero de torres de quemado
generan costos a esa Ciudad.
Toma de decisiones
Usted tomara´ dos decisiones por la Ciudad {A,B,C}:
1. El ma´ximo de torres de quemado que aceptarı´a que se construyan.
2. Cua´ntas fichas esta´ dispuesto a contribuir por cada torre de quemado que se construya.
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Su contribucio´n puede ser positiva o puede ser negativa. Una contribucio´n positiva esta´
ayudando a pagar la torre de quemado. Una contribucio´n negativa equivale a pedir una com-
pensacio´n por permitir la construccio´n de la torre de quemado. Cada torre de quemado cuesta
6 fichas, ma´s la suma de las contribuciones negativas (o compensaciones por pagar). Para que se
construyan torres de quemado, la suma de las contribuciones por cada torre debe ser de al menos
6 fichas.
Co´mo se determina el nu´mero de torres de quemado?
Cada ciudad anuncia el ma´ximo nu´mero de torres que aceptarı´a que se construyan. Se construira´
el nu´mero de torres ma´s bajo anunciado por cualquiera de las ciudades (el mı´nimo). Una vez se
define el nu´mero de torres, se debe verificar si las contribuciones son suficientes:
• Si la suma de las contribuciones por torre es menor a 6 fichas, no se construye el incinerador.
• Si la suma de las contribuciones por torre es exactamente 6 fichas, cada ciudad paga el
nu´mero de fichas que propuso como contribucio´n.
• Si la suma de las contribuciones por torre es mayor a 6 fichas, cada ciudad paga un nu´mero
de fichas menor a lo que propuso como contribucio´n.
– Cada ficha adicional se divide por partes iguales entre todas las ciudades y se le de-
vuelve a cada ciudad.
– La devolucio´n se resta de la contribucio´n ma´xima que estaba dispuesto a hacer el ju-
gador encargado de la ciudad.
Ma´s adelante veremos unos ejemplos y unas preguntas para verificar que usted entendio´ las
reglas de juego. Lo ma´s importante es que sepa que nunca va a pagar ma´s de lo que propuso
contribuir por cada torre, y que ma´ximo se va a construir el nu´mero de torres que usted esta´
dispuesto a aceptar.
La regla de cua´ntas torres se construyen, y cua´nto contribuye cada ciudad, puede resumirse
ası´:
“Acepto cualquier nu´mero de torres de quemado que no sea mayor a Q (ver tabla), siempre y
cuando mi contribucio´n no sea mayor a P por cada unidad.”
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Comunicacio´n entre las ciudades [Only in Chat treatment]
Durante el tiempo disponible para tomar sus decisiones podra´ comunicarse con los participantes
que representan a las otras ciudades. Usted puede hablar de propuestas en te´rminos de cantidades
(Q), y contribuciones (P positivo) o compensaciones (P negativo). Cuando haga una propuesta,
tenga en cuenta que la cantidad Q multiplicada por su contribucio´n propuesta P, no puede exceder
su nu´mero de fichas inicial (30 fichas).
Ganancias de cada ronda
Sus ganancias sera´n iguales a:
+ Fichas iniciales
- (Contribucio´n por torre de quemado) x (Torres de quemado)
+ Beneficios por torres de quemado (ver tabla)
Pagos por participar
Usted jugara´ por un total de 10 rondas. En cada ronda tendra´ un ma´ximo de 2 minutos para
tomar su decisio´n. La ciudad que le fue asignada, ası´ como los participantes que representan a las
otras dos ciudades, sera´n los mismos durante las 10 rondas. Cuando complete todas las rondas
aparecera´ una tabla con los resultados de todas las rondas.
De las 10 rondas, las primeras 3 sera´n de pra´ctica. De las 7 rondas restantes, una sera´ selec-
cionada al azar para pagarle a los tres participantes en su grupo: los representantes de la Ciudad
A, de la Ciudad B, y de la Ciudad C. El pago sera´ el nu´mero de fichas ganadas, en miles de pesos
(redondeados al mu´ltiplo ma´s cercano).
Pagos negativos
Preste mucha atencio´n a las instrucciones del juego, pues de no entender los costos y beneficios
de la torre de quemado, existe la posibilidad de irse sin ganancias. Si en la ronda seleccionada para
determinar su pago sus ganancias son negativas, usted se ira´ con un pago de cero. Esto tiene muy
poca posibilidad de ocurrir, pero es importante que lo tenga en cuenta.
Por favor haga click para continuar.
A.3 Validation Questions
In order to continue you must answer the following questions correctly. If your response is wrong,
you will get an error message within a box, including an explanation of how to compute the correct
answer. You will be shown only the hint for the first question in which you have an incorrect
32
answer. That is, if questions 5 and 8 are wrong, the hint for question 5 will appear. Once you
correct the response to question 5, a hint will appear for question 8. You will find at the bottom of
the page a table with the summary of the game instructions.
First scenario
City A supports the construction of up to 3 burning towers and is willing to contribute a maximum
of 6 tokens per burning tower. City B supports the construction of up to 2 burning towers and is
willing to contribute a maximum of 3 tokens per burning tower. City C supports the construction
of 0 burning towers, and is willing to contribute a maximum of 0 tokens per burning tower.
Q1. How many burning towers will be built?
Response to Q1: Zero (0) towers.
Burning towers are not built. Although City A supports the construction of up to 3 tow-
ers, and City B supports the construction of up to 2 towers, City C does not support the
construction of burning towers. The minimum number of towers proposed is then zero.
Q2. How much will City B have to pay for each burning tower built?
Response to Q2: Zero (0) tokens.
City B proposed to build 2 burning towers, and it was willing to contribute up to 3 tokens
for each tower. As no burning towers were built, none of the players should contribute any
of their proposed contributions.
Second scenario
City A supports the construction of up to 3 burning towers and is willing to contribute a maximum
of 6 tokens per burning tower. City B supports the construction of up to 2 burning towers and is
willing to contribute a maximum of 3 tokens per burning tower. City C supports the construction
of up to 2 burning towers, and is willing to contribute a maximum of -3 tokens (i.e., receive at least
3 tokens) per burning tower.
Q3. How many burning towers will be built?
Response to Q3: Two (2) towers.
Two conditions must be validated. First, determine what is the minimum number of towers
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among all proposals. City A supports the construction of up to 3 towers, and Cities B and
C support the construction of up to 2 towers. The minimum between the three cities is 2
towers. Second, determine if the contributions add up to at least 6 tokens per tower. The
sum of contributions from Cities A, B and C is 6 + 3-3 = 6 tokens. This amount per burning
tower covers the costs of construction and compensation, and the 2 towers can be built.
Q4. How much will City A have to pay for each burning tower built?
Response to Q4: Six (6) tokens.
City A was willing to contribute a maximum of 6 tokens per tower. Since the sum of the
contributions was exactly 6 tokens (see answer to Q3), a city with a positive proposed con-
tribution pays, for each tower built, the maximum amount it was willing to contribute.
Q5. How much will City C receive as a transfer for each burning tower built?
Response to Q5: Three (3) tokens.
City C submitted a contribution of -3 tokens per tower built. That is, it requires compensa-
tion of at least 3 tokens for allowing up to 2 burning towers to be built. Since the sum of the
contributions was exactly 6 tokens (see answer to Q3), a city with negative contributions
receives exactly the minimum amount requested as compensation for each tower built.
Third scenario
City A supports the construction of up to 4 burning towers and is willing to contribute a maximum
of 5 tokens per burning tower. City B supports the construction of up to 5 burning towers and is
willing to contribute a maximum of 4 tokens per burning tower. City C supports the construction
of up to 3 burning towers, and is willing to contribute a maximum of -5 tokens (i.e., receive at least
5 tokens) per burning tower.
Q6. How many burning towers will be built?
Response to Q6: Zero (0) towers.
Two conditions must be validated. First, determine what is the minimum number of towers
among all proposals. City A supports the construction of up to 4 towers, City B supports
the construction of up to 5 towers, and City C supports the construction of up to 3 towers.
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The minimum between the three cities is 3 towers. Second, determine if the contributions
add up to at least 6 tokens per tower. The sum of contributions from Cities A, B and C is 5
+ 4 -5 = 4 tokens. This amount per burning tower does not cover the costs of construction
and compensation, the second condition is not met, and the burning towers are not built.
Fourth scenario
City A supports the construction of up to 3 burning towers and is willing to contribute a maximum
of 9 tokens per burning tower. City B supports the construction of up to 4 burning towers and is
willing to contribute a maximum of 6 tokens per burning tower. City C supports the construction
of up to 3 burning towers, and is willing to contribute a maximum of -6 tokens (i.e., receive at least
6 tokens) per burning tower.
Q7. How many burning towers will be built?
Response to Q7: Three (3) towers.
Two conditions must be validated. First, determine what is the minimum number of towers
among all proposals. Cities A and C support the construction of up to 3 towers, and City
B supports the construction of up to 4 towers. The minimum between the three cities is 3
towers. Second, determine if the contributions add up to at least 6 tokens per tower. The
sum of contributions from Cities A, B and C is 9 + 6-6 = 9 tokens. This amount per burning
tower covers the costs of construction and compensation, and the 3 towers can be built.
Q8. How much will City B have to pay for each burning tower built?
Response to Q8: Five (5) tokens.
Since the sum of contributions between the three cities was 9+6-6=9 tokens per tower, and
only 6 tokens are needed, there is a surplus of 3 tokens. This surplus is divided by three and
refunded to the cities. In this case, each city receives a rebate of 1 token. To compute the
contribution of each player we subtract 1 token from the proposed maximum contribution.
City B was willing to contribute at most 6 tokens per tower built. With the rebate, the actual
contribution of City B will be 6-1=5 tokens per tower built.
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Q9. How much will City C receive as a transfer for each burning tower built?
Response to Q9: Seven (7) tokens.
Since the sum of contributions between the three cities was 9+6-6=9 tokens per tower, and
only 6 tokens are needed, there is a surplus of 3 tokens. This surplus is divided by three and
refunded to the cities. In this case, each city receives a rebate of 1 token. To compute the
contribution of each player we subtract 1 token from the proposed maximum contribution
or compensation. City C requested a minimum compensation of 6 tokens per tower built.
With the rebate, the actual compensation of City B will be -6-1=-7 tokens per tower built.
Q10. How much will be the final earnings for City A?
Response to Q10: Thirty-nine (39) tokens.
Remember that earnings are given by the initial endowed tokens (30 tokens), minus the
total contribution, plus the benefits from the built burning towers. What is the total contri-
bution? City A was willing to contribute at most 9 tokens per tower built. Since the sum of
contributions between the three cities was 9+6-6=9 tokens per tower, and only 6 tokens are
needed, there is a surplus of 3 tokens. This surplus is divided by three and refunded to the
cities. In this case, each city receives a rebate of 1 token. To compute the contribution of each
player we subtract 1 token from the proposed maximum contribution. City A was willing
to contribute at most 9 tokens per tower built. With the rebate, the actual contribution of
City B will be 9-1=8 tokens per tower built. Since 3 towers will be built, City A will pay
a tax of 3x8=24 tokens. When 3 towers are built, City A receives as a benefit 33 additional
tokens. Therefore, earnings from City A are 30-24+33 = 39 tokens.
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B Appendix: Analysis of chat logs
B.1 Coding of individual messages
The chat entries from the sessions allowing communication were manually coded by two indepen-
dent raters, according to their content, following the procedure described below. First, the dataset
was sorted by group and round. Second, the content of each message was classified into the fol-
lowing non-mutually exclusive categories, listed alphabetically. Numbers in brackets correspond
to different message types coded in the same category.
• agreement: [1] After player i makes a proposal, players j and k agree with it. [2] After player
i proposes a price, player j agrees with this price and proposes a quantity, and player k
agrees with both. [3] After player i proposes a quantity, player j agrees with this quantity
and proposes a price, and player k agrees with both.
• ask_c: [1] Player A/B asks Player C if she agrees with a given proposal. [2] Player A/B asks
Player C how much she wants as compensation.
• budget_concern: [1] A player remarks that a given contribution (or set of contributions) will
be insufficient. [2] A player remarks that a given combination of pi × qi exceeding 30 is not
feasible. [3] A player makes her contribution and demands the other players to complete a
contribution of 6 units.
• compensate_c: Player A/B explicitly says ”compensate” when describing the transfer given
to/requested by Player C.
• damage_c: [1] Player A/B explicitly mentions the disutility received by Player C. [2] Player
A/B explicitly mentions that a change in Q will affect Player C.
• decrease_q: A player suggests to decrease q.
• demand_c: Player C makes a precise compensation request. Or, Player C requests a(n impre-
cise) compensation.
• increase_contribution: Player i suggests to Player j to increase her contribution.
• increase_q: Player i suggests to increase the project quantity.
• past_round_choice: A player i reveals her contribution or quantity from a previous round.
• past_round_claim: A player complains about the outcome of the last round
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• past_round_outcome: [1] A player reveals the payment from a previous round. [2] A player
compares her payoff from the past round with respect to a previous round.
• past_round_play: A player suggests to repeat the same request from a previous round.
• past_round_question: A player makes a question about the outcome or choices from a
previous round.
• proposal_ab: [1] Player A/B makes a suggestion to player B/A regarding the contribution,
the quantity, or both contribution and quantity. [2] Player C makes a suggestion to players
A and B regarding the contribution, the quantity, or both contribution and quantity.
• proposal_all: A player makes a proposal on how all players, including herself, should play
(either the contribution, the quantity, or both).
• proposal_c: Player A/B makes a suggestion to player C regarding the contribution, the
quantity, or both.
• question: A player poses a question about the current round. Questions include agreements
and queries about another player’s requests.
• rebate: A player mentions that excess contributions are divided among all group members.
• testing: A player suggests to try a given request, and see what happens with their payoffs.
• timeout: A player reminds the other players to choose swiftly due to the time constraint.
• unclear_pq: In the message is not clear whether the player is proposing a quantity or a
contribution.
• unequal_earnings: [1] Player A/B mentions that Player C is supposed to earn less in this
game setting. [2] A player mentions that she is earning less than the others.
• veto_threat: Player C makes an explicit threat of requesting q = 0.
• we_all_lose: A player mentions that, given a strategy, all three players receive lower pay-
offs.
• we_all_win: [1] A player mentions that, given a strategy, all three players receive higher
payoffs. [2] A player mentions that the idea of the game is that all players receive substantial
payoffs.
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B.2 Coding of group outcomes based on chat information
The chat entries from each group in each round were analyzed to classify group outcomes based
on the chat history from the round interaction. Group interactions in a given round were classified
into the following non-mutually exclusive categories, listed alphabetically.
• AB_did_not_chat: Player A/B did not intervene in the chat during the round.
• C_did_not_chat: Player C did not intervene in the chat during the round.
• C_doesnotreveal_P: Player C chatted, but never revealed the intended compensation.
• agreement_exceeds_budget: Players agreed on a request such that pi × qi > 30 for at least
one player.
• did_not_chat: Players did not chat during the round.
• only_C_chats: Only Player C chatted during the round.
• prices_nonmentioned: Neither contributions or compensations were mentioned during the
round.
• realized_insufficient_budget: A player realizes that budget will be insufficient and pro-
poses a different agreement.
• rebate_toincrease_P: Players agree on increasing their contribution to increase the rebate.
• repeat_past_round: Players agree on repeated the requests from a previous round.
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B.3 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Percentage of occurrence and pairwise correlation with q > 0. Practice rounds are excluded.
Message type Short description of message type Occurrence
[Percentage]
Correlation with
q > 0 (p−value)
Proposals
proposal AB A player makes a proposal to City A/B, or to both 40.9% -0.1121 (0.166)
proposal C A player makes a proposal to City C 24.0% -0.0727 (0.370)
agreement Players reach a non-binding agreement 20.8% 0.2124 (0.008)
proposal all A player makes a proposal to Cities A, B and C 13.0% 0.0566 (0.486)
Interactions with Type H player (City C)
demand C City C makes a request 39.0% 0.0026 (0.975)
ask C City A/B asks City C about a request 20.1% -0.0743 (0.360)
compensate C City A/B says ”compensate” 10.4% -0.0872 (0.282)
damage C City C points out her disutility from a request 6.5% -0.1029 (0.204)
veto threat Explicit threat from City C to request qi = 0 1.9% -0.1055 (0.193)
History of the game
past round outcome A player reveals her payoff from a past round 20.1% -0.109 (0.178)
past round play A player suggests to repeat the request from a
past round
20.1% 0.03 (0.712)
past round question A player asks about an action/outcome from a
past round
18.2% -0.1117 (0.168)
past round claim A player complains about a past outcome 16.2% -0.1529 (0.058)
past round choice A player reveals her request from a past round 3.2% 0.0465 (0.567)
Modify requests
testing Try a new strategy to see what happens 8.4% 0.0068 (0.933)
increase contribution A player suggests to increase the contribution 6.5% -0.1029 (0.204)
increase q A player suggests to increase the quantity 4.5% -0.1186 (0.143)
we all win A mention that a given strategy makes a win to all 3.2% -0.1108 (0.171)
we all lose A mention that a given strategy makes a loss to all 2.6% 0.0239 (0.769)
decrease q A player suggests to decrease the quantity 0.6% 0.0552 (0.496)
Other message types
question Queries about agreements or player’s request 35.7% -0.1309 (0.106)
timeout A reminder to choose rapidly given the time
constraint
11.7% 0.0316 (0.698)
unequal earnings A mention that City C is supposed to earn less 3.2% -0.1108 (0.171)
rebate A mention that excess contributions are rebated 3.2% -0.0322 (0.692)
unclear pq Not clear if the message contains ci or qi 1.3% -0.0448 (0.581)
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Table A.2: Chat outcomes. Percentage of occurrence and their pairwise correlation with a positive provision
of the project (q > 0). Practice rounds (1 to 3) are excluded from the analysis.
Chat outcome Short description of chat outcome Occurrence
[Percentage]
Correlation with
q > 0 (p−value)
Use of communication
C doesnotreveal P City C did not reveal intended compensation 11.7% -0.099 (0.224)
did not chat Players did not chat 6.5% 0.010 (0.899)
only C chats Cities A and B did not chat 4.5% 0.015 (0.852)
C did not chat City C did not chat 1.9% 0.096 (0.235)
AB did not chat City A/B did not chat 1.3% 0.078 (0.334)
prices nonmentioned Contributions not mentioned 1.3% -0.045 (0.581)
Type of agreements
noted insufficient PQ A player noted the agreement is unfeasible 7.1% -0.189 (0.019)
agreement exceeds PQ Players agree on an unfeasible request 4.5% -0.253 (0.002)
repeat past round Players agree on repeating a past request 1.9% -0.005 (0.955)
rebate toincrease P Players agreed on increasing the rebate 1.3% -0.045 (0.581)
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